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I. ON CROSS APPEAL, H A T C H ' S M A R C H 3, 2001, CHANGE
ORDER NO. 3 CONSTITUTES AN ASSUMPTION OR
R E A F F I R M A T I O N BY THE P A R T N E R S H I P S p i ?. y \ ppt IIM I II' lin
AGENT O F T H E $78,000 DEBT. 1
A. Hatcli Acted witlini tlle Scope of his Author ity When he Assumed and
Reaffirmed E P C O ' s Debt for the Partnership.
1 he question presented by this appeal is whether a general partnership (51-SPR/

Broadstone^ i ,

>lilK

j t > 1 > ..ou) in money loaned or advanced by a i .<-.

' •)

formally ratified, confirmed, assumed, and acknowledged as a partnership debt by the
latter partner. There are only two possibilities with respect to the $78,000. Either it was
a partnership u c u a; :ne time it was advanced, fa proposition rejectee! :••. uw JKU ^ •:.: i

construction contract agreeing to renav the sum from partnership assets. The lacts do not
admit of any other resi ill.
S p e a l k a l i > ji!iM<tijii tiic inai * .- ..: ii.iiiiw \\\^. me ^.,*

s;

••' vas not a pai ti lei si: up

debt, tl le testii i 101 i.y in i tl ne it ee : rd j vsas tc ll ic effect tl lat t 1 le pai tnei si rip betweei I I latel i and
Chimento had progressed to the ponit

that Hatch was actively lining up potential tenants

This section replies to Part 1\ ;^ i -SPR's Appellate l>i ici. pages ^3 u • 4 • and to
4 5K ivph brief, pages 9 •<*

i\>\: •
2

For ease of reference Change Order # 3, and the check winch prompted it, are
attached hereto as A d d e n d u m A.
Neither j u d g e Schofield nor Judge Mou formally m a d e a finding as to the date
tl: ie 51 SPR/Broadstone partnership w-^ formed, although they definitely found, that the
1

and/or leases for the Northshore buildings. [TR. 60]. Although 51-SPR had not funded
the construction monies, nor had the parties' purchased the property, Hatch had selected
EPCO to be the contractor and was actively pursuing the partnerships goals and
ambitions. [Tr. 6063]. Hatch solicited EPCO in his capacity as a representative of the
Northshore project, for money to be used to pay Hubble Engineering for the civil
engineering on Northshore I and II. Id. The trial court found that when Richard
Ellsworth advanced the money to Hatch, he did not learn whether it was used to pay for
engineering on the Williams property (although still the Northshore I and II project) or
the Automall property. [See, Findings and Conclusions, App. "C," f 5, p. 5, % 25, p. 1011 to Appelee's answering brief]. However, there was no doubt in the record, and
everyone was in agreement at trial, that Hatch represented that the $78,000 would be
used for the Northshore I and I properties, where EPCO was to perform the construction.
Id.
Having said all of the above, in this appeal, EPCO is less concerned with
challenging the trial court's findings that the $78,000 was not a partnership debt at the
time it was incurred. Rather, EPCO challenges the trial court's conclusions (or rather the
absence thereof) that Guy Hatch as a managing partner did not made the $78,000 a
partnership debt when he modified the construction contract by Change Order # 3
between Broadstone and EPCO, thereby agreeing to reimburse EPCO the $78,000 from

June 15, Addendum certainly qualified as a partnership agreement.
2

partnership assets. It is simply contradictory for the two trial courts and for this Court to
find that nearly S; ini.ur,, viuiiars in construction contracts (in
( •* •••

•—

:...:••

-

.,.-..

fc

* , sin^K e e l \ executed and

formally signed change order — signed during a time when the managing partner had
full actual, implied and apparent aiilllority — is not a partnership debt.
The general KIIC is sv.1 ioiUi in .v> \ .,, „•.. . . ; C L . .
A loan made to a partner oeiore tne lonnaiion 01 a paiineiship is nui a
partnership debt for which the firm is liable, unless it is expressly
assumed
by the partnership
However, in view of the Uniform Partnership Act's
provision thai all partners are liable joiml\ tor all debts and obligations of
the partnership, parties who form a partnership and agree to convert
IIicliviciual debt into a debt of ihe partnership become liable individually for
the debt so converted just as though the partnership had contracted the debt
in the first instance. [Emphasis added/]
51-SPR would have this court ignore the express provisions of Uniform
Partnership Act, to the effect that each partner is an agent of the partnership for the
purposes of its business, and the actions of of each partner IMIKK the partnership. ;. lah
end' 1 A n n ° 1"^ I l|l|» ' Mi' "'» i"t n\ ^ heiliri H a l ' l i ' s . r

,i* 1 P" ' M I ihe p e tn^i^'Mp iMhe

time he signed change order No. 3 is governed bv ai'encx laws The relevant agency
principles are as follows: The contract of the agent is the contract of the principal, and
the principal ma\ be sued ilicieon (utr.ji.j

\. ticisiiDuuui. > M r.ji

4

Utah Code Ann.§ 48-1-6 states that M[e]very partner is an agent of the
partnership for purposes of its business, and the act of every partner...binds the
partnership." See, also, Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990).(Joint ventine
partner is liable for debts inoinv.l bv other partner)
3

1992). (Holding that agents who signed a deed to a buyer on behalf of an undisclosed
corporation bound the corporation by their actions). The principal is liable for the acts
and agreements of the agent performed within the scope of the agent's authority. Id.
The fact that the agent acts in his own name without disclosing his
principal does not preclude liability on the part of the principal when he is
discovered to be such by a third party who has dealt with the agent. This is
true even if the third person dealing with the agent did not learn of the
existence of the principal until after the bargain was completed. Id at 110.
[Citations omitted].
No one in this case has ever suggested that Hatch did not have actual, implied and
apparent authority to act for the partnership in the construction of Northshore I and II.
The Joint Venture Agreement (appearing as Addendum A to the EPCO's Appellee's
answering brief) confers all such authority on Guy Hatch, and the owner of 51-SPR has
repeatedly acknowledged at trial and in depositions that Hatch had express authority to
sign contracts and change orders, which actions he repeatedly performed. [Tr. 381-382].
Thus the only remaining question is whether of not the signing of Changer Order 3 was
within the scope of Mr. Hatch's authority as the construction manager of North Shore I
and II.
51-SPR argues at page 17 of its reply brief that the change order cannot be
binding on the partnership because it was not for the purpose of carrying on the business
of the partnership in the usual way. However, 51-SPR completely misconstrues the
"scope of agency" principles governing the change order. The correct rule governing
agency is set forth in Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 61 P.3d 1009
4

(I Jtah 2002).
The fact that Hansen committed fraud does not necessarily mean he acted
outside of his authority. Scope of authority refers to those acts which are so
closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly
and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even
though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the
employment. Id. [Citations 011lilted].
WiHillcy i n v o U - i the actions of a real estate agent who fraiiamcnm aiienru n-iing
agreements < ill i a seller 1 1 le Coi u t of • \ ppeals 1 leld tl I; it tl IC I i ai idi il ::i it : u ;tioi is coi ild
never be construed to be willnil the agent's authority. Flie Supreme Court disagreed
saying tllat scope is determined by iliree factors: 1) Ihe agent's actions must be of the
kind the agent is employed to perloi in: 1) the agent's comi..* .nasi ix \\i:..
( ) f

- P

••

tf

:

• •

'

. • • • • t i l '

• i

*, UM, .

•'

agent's act must be motivated, at least in part, by MIL- puipose of serving the principal's
interest. Id at 1017. The Supreme Court considered the fraudulent altering of the listing
agreements against these factors and i-^ki .i^: ihe agent's actions, aiir.ougn : ;i:.;-: ; ;t,
1}

/ere 1 vitl lii I tl le scope ol 1 lis agency and v >ei e ir i lpi ited to 1 1 n t pi ii icipa] Id
\pply the forgoing standards to the case at bar, this court can rule as a matter of

law that Change Order No. 3 is binding on the partnership. First, the change order
signed : \ i latch agreeing to repay the $ 78,000 ad' 'ai iced by EI }CO was well \ it!: lii i tl t z
"gener

'

J

•

;

..m."-:1*

* :'

'nueca, both Judge Schofield and

Judge Stott held that dozens of change orders signed by Hatch were binding upon 5 1 SPP The TV Agreement specified that Hatch was authorized to enter construction
5

contracts, and construction managers inherently and by definition are authorized to
manage projects and to sign construction documents. With Guy Hatch out of the picture,
it is not surprising that the evidence was inconclusive as to v/hether or not Hatch actually
paid the engineering firm he represented to EPCO that he was going to pay, but there was
never any doubt that the engineering in question related to North Shore I and II, over
whom Hatch was the designated agent.
Second, the change order was signed at the height of construction, when scores of
construction documents (i.e. change orders, leases, payment requisitions, purchase
orders, construction loan documents, contracts, and like documents) were being signed
by Hatch on behalf of the partnership. The change order in question was done in the
ordinary course of the business of running the partnership affairs.5 Hatch signed the
change order during working hours of the day, while he signed other change orders, and
did so in response to this and other contract documents which were being processed by
him. Thus, Hatch's actions in signing the change order were within the ordinary time
and spacial boundaries of Hatch's responsibilities for the partnership. Again, all of these
related agreements (i.e. contracts and change orders) signed by Hatch have been
enforced against 51-SPR.
Third, signing the Change Order was motivated at least in part for the

5

51-SPR intimated at trial that Hatch may have diverted some of the construction
loan money for non-partnership purposes. But there has never been any testimony to the
effect that Hatch diverted the $78,000 to a non-partnership purpose.
6

partnership's interest. Specifically to this latter point, no one has ever suggested that
Hatch did not represent to EPCO that the money would be used for engineering on
Northshore I and II, regardless of where the site was to be located.6 In reaffirming the
debt by change order, Hatch was merely fulfilling a promise he had made earlier to
provide a contract extra in return for the $78,000 to reimburse EPCO for the cost of the
site work once the construction loan was in place. At the time the change order was
signed, as an undisclosed principal of Broadstone, EPCO was not even aware that Hatch
had 51-SPR as a silent partner. [See, Findings and Conclusions, App. "C," % 6, to
Appelee's answering brief] Thus, EPCO derived no personal benefit in conferring the
money to Hatch, other than as the selected contractor for Broadstone, it felt duty-bound
to see that the site was prepared for the structure EPCO intended to build. [TR. 60-63].
EPCO had the right to rely on Hatch's signed change order. Otherwise EPCO may
have elected not to perform the last portion of the work, it may have declared the owner
in breach, or it may demanded immediate reimbursement for the monies advanced.
Hatch's signature on the change order obviated the need for these other extreme

6

Throughout 51-SPR's reply brief, it distorts the trial courts findings as well as
the evidence concerning the $78,000. For example, on pages 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
and 17 of 51-SPR's reply brief, it emphatically states, as though it were an established
fact, that the $78,000 was definitely used for engineering on the William's property.
However, the testimony below - and the findings of the trial court- were to the effect that
although Mr. Ellsworth thought the money would be used for engineering site drawings
for either the William's property or for Northshore Automall property, no one knew
where the $78,000 was actually applied. [See. Findings and Conclusions, App. "C," %f
3,4,5, 25, to Appelee's answering brief; TR. 61-63].
7

measures, and allowed the partnership to continue to the fruition of the project based
upon the signed promise to pay. The partnership clearly derived a benefit in issuing the
change order. Finally, with Hatch and his records absent from the proceeding below, 51SPR has not shown that the $78,000 was spent on exactly what Hatch represented it
would be used for, namely, the design and site work for Northshore I and II. As between
51-SPR as Hatch's partner, and an innocent third-party contractor, all doubt should be
resolved in favor of EPCO who provided funds for the project, or thought that it was
providing funds for the project. It simply can not be argued in this context that Hatch's
actions were not at least in part in furtherance of partnership goals and objectives. This
is so particularly from EPCO's stand point, who was not even aware of 51-SPR at the
time of the advance or the change order. Its only motivation was in having the site
prepared to receive the buildings it was going to construct.
Even if one were to accept at face value 51-SPR's inference that Hatch may not
have used the money for a partnership purpose, such a conclusion is of no consequence
to an innocent creditor of the partnership who acts in reliance on one partner's
representations. As long as Hatch was within the scope of his authority, even a fraudulent
act is binding on the partnership. Wardley, 61 P.3d, Supra at 1018. And "[w]hen an
[agent's] activity is so clearly within or outside of the scope of employment that
reasonable minds can not differ, the court may decide the issue as a matter of law." On
the face of this transaction, Hatch's action were within the general parameters of what a

8

construction manager has authority to do, it was in the time and spacial bonderizes of his
agency, and his actions were on their face, at least partially motivated by a partnership
purpose.
B. EPCO Has Marshaled the Facts Supporting its Position, the Issue Is to Be
Reviewed De Novo, and the Trial Court Made No Factual Findings on the Effect
of Change Order No. 3.

51-SPR argues at page 13 of its brief in opposition to the cross appeal that EPCO
has marshaling problems. This statement is incorrect on three counts: First, as noted in
the cross-appeal brief, the agency issue of whether the change order was binding on the
partnership as a partnership debt was raised in a summary judgment.7 [R. 7393-7509;
7827-7900]. This summary judgment motion is reviewed de novo, with no deference to
the trial court. Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 P.3d 1054 (Utah 2002).
Second, EPCO adequately marshaled all of the testimony and evidence at trail relevant to
the $78,000 in its brief in opposition at page 37. Third, although EPCO respectfully
disagrees with the holding, EPCO's argument on appeal is that even if one takes the
factual holdings of the trial court for face value: namely, that the $78,000 was incurred
before the partnership was formed, that it was not a partnership debt, or that it related to
an adjoining parcel, the debt was ratified and adopted by the partnership at the execution
of change order No. 3. This latter act raises a stand-alone subsidiary issue of whether the

7

The issue was argued in conjunction with a brief asking for summary judgment
on a number of change orders, with specific arguments as to the $78,000 change order.
9

advance is a partnership debt. The trial court's rulings focused exclusively on the nature
of the relationship at the time the $78,000 was advanced, [See, Findings and
Conclusions, App. "C," to Appelee's answering brief], but ignored the issue probed by
this appeal as to the effect of the change order in converting the debt from a personal one
to a partnership obligation. In short, the trial court made no ruling on the effect of the
$78,000 when viewed in the light of a ratification or assumption of the debt issue by way
of the change order, although it was a portion of the argument made on that point. The
trial court is obligated to make a ruling on each substantive legal issue present to him by
the litigants. Silliman v. Powell, 642 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1982); Ruckerv. Dalton, 598
P.2d 1336, 1339 (Utah 1979). Yet in the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the $78,000
was not a partnership obligation at the time it was advanced in its findings and
conclusions, [See, Findings and Conclusions, App. "C," to Appelee's answering brief] ]
but the order is silent on the agency issues or the effect of the change order on the
$78,000 in converting it to a partnership obligation.
C. The Agency and Scope of Authority Issues Related to the $78,000 were
Preserved at the Trial Court Level.
51-SPR also argues at page 16 of its rely brief that the agency issues for the
$78,000 was not preserved for appeal. ["By failing to preserve these arguments below,
EPCO has waived them."] Attached to this reply brief as Addendum "B" are several
pages from the opening and closing arguments in this case in which the agency issue was
clearly argued and presented to the court. It was presented in both ways - both as to the

10

issue of Hatch's authority when he first obtained the $78,000 - but also, it will be seen that it was argued as a matter of agency law in light of the change order. As noted above,
it was also argued in a portion of the brief in which the issue was raised in summary
judgment. [R. 7393-7509; 7826-7900]. Based upon the brief and opening and closing
arguments at trial, it appears clear from the record that the issue was preserved both as it
related to the relationship of the parties at the time the money was advanced, [a
proposition rejected by the trial court] and as an agency question based upon the change
order.
II. THE CONTRACT DUE DATES, AMOUNTS, AND INTEREST THAT
51-SPR FAILED TO PAY WERE COMPLETE, FIXED, AND
LIQUIDATED AS OF THE DATE OF TRIAL, AND IT WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR NOT TO PERMIT RECOVERY FOR
CONTRACTUAL INTEREST ON THOSE SUMS.
A. Contractual Interest Is Always Liquidated, and Even If it Were Not, the Dates
and the Amounts Owed Are Fixed and Complete.8
If this Court does not reverse the trial court in its ruling on interest, it is not too
strong of a statement to say that it may be perhaps the only case in Utah appellate court
history where a non-breaching partying in a contract action for money damages was
denied interest on the unpaid debt. This is so whether one views the interest obligation as
contractual in nature as in this case, or as an element of common law damages. "In
contract cases, certainly, interest on amounts found to be due in judicial proceedings is
recovery to which the creditor is due a matter of law." Lignell v. Berg, 593 P2d 800, 809

8

This section replies to Part VI of 51-SPR's Reply brief, pp. 22-25.
11

(Utah 1979). [Emphasis added]. Breach of contract damages seek to restore the nonbreaching party to the position he or she would have been in but for the breach.
Consolidated Coal v. Division of State Lands, 886 P.2d 514, 524, (Utah 1994). In Utah,
interest must be paid on agreed-upon amounts, in order that the breaching party is not
unjustly enriched by its failure to pay amounts due under the contract. Canyon Country
Store v. Bracey, 781 P.d 414, 422 (Utah 1998). This is so because "paying money with
interest is, in effect, precisely the same as paying it when it became due without interest."
Mont Trucking v. Entrada Industries, 802 P.2d 799, ft. nt. 1 (Utah App. 1990). Without
being paid interest on an un-paid contract debt, the non-breaching party can not be made
whole. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P.3d 188, (Utah App. 2003). Utah appellate
courts have unilaterally directed that interest be paid, even when neither party requested
interest in the proceeding below or on appeal. Progressive Music Supply, Inc. v.
McKean, 515 P.2d 616 (Utah 1973). A litigants failure to "plead a request for interest is
of no consequence because " the interest issue is injected by law into every action for the
payment of past due money." Fitsgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.d 301 304 (Utah App.
1987) (Quoting Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979). Moreover, "[a}ny
judgment entered into on a lawful contract shall bear the interest agreed upon by the
parties." Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(2). The "shall" language in §15-1-4 does not admit
of any trial court discretion to disallow such interest. Stroud v. Stroud, 733 P.2d 649,
650 (Utah App. 1987).
The trial court held that "the evidence establishes that 51-SPR failed and refused
12

to pay the June, July and August, 2002 draw requests, thereby breaching its contract with
Ellsworth Paulsen/' [Findings and Conclusions, p. 9, App. "C," of the answering brief].
The trial court went on to hold that: 'The court further finds that Ellsworth Paulsen
completed all of the required work, and there is no evidence to establish that any of the
work is defective or otherwise has problems." Id. The forgoing conclusions are
inherently inconsistent with and inimical to a holding that EPCO is not entitled to interest
on over $500,000 which 51-SPR wrongfully held for over two and one half years up to
the date judgment was entered.9 Such a holding fails to take into account the time value
of money, such that EPCO will not be made whole for exactly $188,401.33, if it is not
allowed interests for the period of time in question. 10 Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P.
3d 188, 205 (Utah App. 2003)( Holding that interest must be awarded in order to make
the plaintiff whole from the loss of use of his money over time). The above sum
represents the interest on the money not paid, calculated from 30 days after final work,
inspection, and occupancy of the building by 51-SPR. [Interest Schedules, App. "C"
hereto]. The court awarded judgment for contract balances on Northshore I of
$199,830.53, and on Northshore II of $283,991.26.u The dates those sums became
9

The court did award the contractual interest post-judgment.

10

At the conclusion of trial, the court requested the parties to provide the interest
calculations and to brief the same. The numbers or the amounts are not in dispute, as
both parties reached the same calculation, except that 51-SPR's schedule disallowed
interest for the three months of draws not submitted to Guy Hatch. [App. "C" herof].
11

If this court permits recovery of the $78,000, this sum, and interest thereon at
10% per annum as set forth in the contract, should be added into the judgment on
13

payable is arrived in one of two ways: 1) either 30 days after the work was performed for
which such payments were requested as set forth in the contract; or, 2) 30 days after final
completion and acceptance of the project,

12

as EPCO has claimed. EPCO submitted

evidence to the court based upon the latter date out of an abundance of deference to the
outside date upon which interest might become due. Either way, the amounts are fixed,
and complete, and utterly liquidated.
The trial court's justification for denying interest is as follows:
With regard to Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for prejudgment interest, the
Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen can not recovery [sic] its claim for
prejudgment interest against 51-SPR. It is undisputed that Ellsworth
Paulsen never submitted to anyone its final payment application on
Building I or the final two applications on Building II. These three
applications remain unsigned. It is not possible for the court to set a
specific date on which the payment of the un-submitted applications
became due. The Court has considered the information submitted by the
parties subsequent to the time of trail with respect to the calculation of prejudgment interest and the court can not, as Ellsworth Paulsen suggests,
simply "pick a date" from which interest begins to accrue. [App. "C," f 39,
p. 15 of EPCO's answering brief].
The above legal conclusion is a matter of law and is reviewed for correctness,
with no deference to the trial court. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P. 3d 188, 205 (Utah

Northshore II.
12

The trial court apparently believed this date to be too random to result in a
liquidated calculation. Yet we could find nothing in the jurisprudence of Utah which
permits interest to be waived on real property instruments, installment obligations, or
notes, simply because of an absence of demand, invoicing, or a timely statement. The
proper approach is to take the last date upon which payment could be due, even without
an invoice, and run the interest calculation from that date. This is how EPCO arrived at
its figure.
14

App. 2003). In addition, where there is an unambiguous contract clause which addresses
the subject of interest, the trial court's conclusions with respect to such a contract
interpretation is also reviewed for correctness. Id. The above analysis by the trial court
is flawed on two counts: First it blurs the distinction between contract interest and
common law damage interest. In the former case, interest is as substantive a part of the
debt as is the principal. It is a component of recovery that is liquidated by the parties'
agreement to the same extent, and in the same way the principal is liquidated. One can
not find that the debtor breached the contract and that principal is owed, and
correspondingly not find that the contractual interest is also owed. Famsworth v.,
Jensen, 217 P.2d 494 (Utah 1950). Failure to pay the contract, whether principal or
interest, is a breach, and the interest is an element of damages that necessarily flows from
the finding of the non-payment.
Second, even if the trial court's statement involved a holding on common law
damage interest, the holding is incorrect, because the debt amounts are complete, fixed,
and certain, and are, therefore, liquidated, requiring an award of interest. Bjork v. April
Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977).
In Farnsworth, 217 Supra at 496, property purchasers refused to pay interest on a
farm due to the seller's default in clearing title to the farm. The court held that even the
default of the sellers in failing to clear title could not suspend contractual interest. Id at
496. The court went on to hold that the only way the buyers could suspend contractual
interest was for them to have tendered the amount of the interest into the court or into
15

escrow. Id. The Court held that Interest can only be suspended when the debtor
manifests that it is ready, willing, and able to pay the obligation, but is prevented from
doing so by some affirmative act of the creditor. Id. The court held that the buyers could
not enjoy the benefits of occupying the property bought under contract, while claiming
that the interest set forth in the contract was suspended because the title was not clear.
Id.
51-SPR argues in its reply brief at page 21-22 that the trial court was correct
because the contract specifies that no payment by Broadstone was due until the draw was
submitted. What 51-SPR fails to candidly acknowledge to the court is that long before
EPCO stopped submitting the draws, Broadstone had failed to timely pay or process
draws. Broadstone had abandoned the project, preventing the processing of draws. The
draws are on standard AIA Form G702 (1992) forms. These forms require change orders
to be integrated into the draw calculation so that the contract price is duly adjusted. They
also require the signature of the architect, or, if the owner assumes that duty, as it did in
this instance, it requires the signature of the owner. Where the owner (both Hatch and
51-SPR) refuses to speak with you, refuses to process change orders, and refuses to sign
draws, there is simply no way for EPCO to finalize the same on form G702. To permit
51-SPR to ignore its contractual duty to process and pay draws, then reward that
dereliction by suspending the agreed-upon interest for over two years on the flimsy
premise that EPCO's lack of invoicing excused interest, is to elevate form over
substance, triviality over materiality.
16

51-SPR gives new definition to legal hair-splitting when it contends that it had
no duty to pay, since the draw was not finalized. Under this scenario, 51-SPR can enjoy
all of the benefits of the construction contracts, including turn-key completion of the
buildings by scores of workers, but excuse its performance by an ambiguity in the
invoicing. All this while 51-SR is ignoring numerous demands to Hatch and to 51-SPR ,
verbally, and in letters: liens, threats, suits and demands, even in months before and up
to the time the project was completed. 51-SPR had one duty under its contract, namely,
to timely pay. Yet as of the date of this brief, 51-SPR has steadfastly repudiated any
obligation to pay for construction work on the project. These actions are not consistent
with the Farnsworth requirement that contract interest can only be suspended when the
debtor tenders payments, or manifests that it is ready willing and able to pay, but is
prevented from doing so by the creditor. Id at 496.
B. Interest Is Due on the Full Amount Appearing in the Contract, and Should Not
Be Reduced by Common Law Damages Interest Paid to the Subcontracts on the
Eve of Trial.

51SPR argues at page 24 of its reply that EPCO's suggestion that it should be paid
contractual interest on the full amount owed up to the date 51-SPR paid the
subcontractors

13

(under judgment by the trial court) is "overreaching." It predicates this

13

The schedules appearing in App. "D" hereof take into account a reduction of
the interest owed on the contract balances equal to the amounts paid to the
subcontractors. But the $188,401.33 requested in this appeal contemplates payment to
EPCO of interest on all contract amounts due, until the subcontractors were paid full,
without a deduction for prejudgment interest paid to the subcontractors on the door-steps
17

argument on the stretched-to- the-breaking-point notion that since EPCO did not keep
51-SPR indemnified from amounts owed to subcontractors, (even though 51-SPR did not
itself pay those amounts) 51-SPR had to pay interest to the subcontractors. What this
argument fails to take into account is that EPCO had a "pay when paid" clause in its
subcontracts, such that it literally was not obligated to pay to its subcontractors anything
until it was paid by 51-SPR. Thus, at no time were the subcontractors owed contractual
interest by EPCO, even though they collected pre-judgment damage interest from 51SPR on their lien and failure-to-obtain-a- bond claims. The amount due EPCO for
interest on its contract is for all amounts not paid by 51-SPR, under the prime contract.
EPCO's entitlement to interest on the full amount due, should not be reduced by an
interest amount it did not, and does not owe to sub-contractors below. There is no
'double recovery" or "wind-fall," since 51-SPR will only be paying the interest it
contracted to pay. The interest that the trial court ordered14 to be paid to the
subcontractors was damages interest owed, which was completely independent of
EPCO's contract. In order to keep faith with the terms of the contract, EPCO should be
paid interest on the full payments wrongfully withheld by 51-SPR, without regard or
deduction for amounts paid to subcontractors under separate legal theories and prejudgment damage calculations.
of trial.
14

EPCO finds it curious that the trial court could hold that 51-SPR was liable for
pre-judgment interest owed to subcontractors on amounts not paid through EPCO, but
denied interest under the contract for amounts not paid to EPCO.
18

As guardians of the law, and of the "fairness" and "justice" principles enshrined in
the law, EPCO asks this Court of Appeals to make it whole by awarding interest on the
amounts not paid by 51-SPR under its joint venture contract.

III. IF EPCO PREVAILS ON APPEAL, IT REQUESTS ATTORNEY
FEES ON APPEAL.
As part of its cross-appeal, EPCO requests attorney fees on appeal. Such fees, are
appropriate where fees were awarded below in a mechanic's lien action, and the same
party prevails on appeal. J.V. Hatch Construction, Inc. v. Kapros, 971 P.2d 8, 16 (Utah
App. 1998).
CONCLUSION
On cross-appeal, EPCO requests that this court reverse the trial court to reimburse
EPCO for the $78,000 it advanced to Broadstone as a partnership debt, as memorialized,
affirmed and ratified by Broadstone in Change Order No. 3. to the prime contract. EPCO
also requests that it be given judgment for interest on the $78,000, as well as reversal of
the trial court in its denial of $188,401.33 in interest for monies wrongfully withheld by
51-SPR in contract balances. Lastly, since attorney fees were granted below, EPCO
requests its attorney fees on appeal.
In opposition to 51-SPR, EPCO requests that the Court of Appeals: 1) uphold the
trial court's ruling granting contract liability on the joint venture issue; 2) uphold the trial
court in granting a mechanic's lien to EPCO for the balance owed; 3) uphold the trial
court in its factual findings regarding the effective date of the lien waivers and the
19

indemnities; 4) uphold the trial court's findings that the lien filed by EPCO was not
abusive; and 5) uphold the trial court's award of attorney fees.

1lL
DATED this '^ /day of May, 2005.
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

Mark L. Poulsen1
Attorney for the Appellee,
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Broadstone investments

Mark Wilson

Alle^Wes-hfeuai^-^^

\ v

Guy Hatch

By:

By:

l < T/W/n > sr

By

Architect

Project Manager

Date-

Oale:

L.L.C
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1909 South Washington Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-0027

U-8-

-91

there's change orders on every project in America

2

average is that there is a 13 percent change orders per project,

3

and so

4

to mathematical certainly, and you're going to have additions.

change orders are going to occur.

5

The national

Architects can't design

The Court only has to ask himself one, you know, if Guy

6

Hatch had the authority, then it's over.

If he didn't have the

7

authority do we still get it?

8

approximately $70,000, the difference between those two.

9

going to go through them one by one and show the Court that

That's going to pertain to another
We're

10

(inaudible) those were hollow doors, now they're solid mahogany

11

doors.

12

chrome faucets and

13

orders.

14

There was Monticello

(inaudible) faucets and now there's

(inaudible) one by one on those 40 change

A second issue on the change orders, your Honor, on the

15

$73,000 Williams property -- or

16

we're going to show the Court a signed change order.

17

signed late.

18

on.

19

very clearly had authority.

20

It was signed by Guy Hatch early m

this process while he

Your Honor, that's the beginning and the ending analysis
on the $78,000.

22

that's a partnership debt.

23

25

It's not

It wasn't one of the ones that were signed later

21

24

(inaudible) let's just go to --

There's a signed change order by a partner,
It is every time.

In addition to whether it's a partnership debt, and
it's absolutely a partnership debt.
I question.

I don't think there's any

We have a signed change order.

That's all.

The

•10-

1

authority is (inaudible) on that.

2

In addition to the issue of whether it's a partnership

3

debt is the issue of whether or not it's lienable

4

this to the Court

5

authentic $78,000 modification to this contract, that's a

6

contract.

7

contract it's lienable

8
9

I'll just say

If there's a contract modification, an

A change order is a contract.

Whenever you have a

Counsel is trying to make the argument m

this case

that, "Gee, if it doesn't actually get incorporated into the

10

project it's not lienable."

11

there's a contract or a construction contract, and even if it has

12

components that don't actually go to the project, you can still

13

lien it.

14

electrical design.

15

not consumed.

16

they're recoverable as part of the construction contract.

17

That's not correct, your Honor.

If

(Inaudible) overhead, a mechanical design, an
Oh, they don't go into the project

They're

They don't become structures on the land, but

So there's two ways to get a lien in Utah.

Either you

18

have a construction agreement and you lien for the amount of your

19

agreement, or you improve real property like the subs did this

20

home agreement and those are two legitimate ways to get a lien in

21

Utah.

22

The subs improved the property.

This one isn't a direct

23

improvement -- I mean we' re going to show that it does improve

24

the property, that it benefitted this property very dramatically.

25

We're going to show that, your Honor.

But quiet and apart for
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looked at those change order documents, those books, there's tiny

2

margins, two percent margins (inaudible) to Ellsworth Paulsen on

3

markup on those change orders, that my client incurred $200,000

4

in change orders.

5

It paid those amounts or will pay them.

Those are costs to them, and they don't just vanish into

6

thin air

7

formality done on our part, or a lack of diligence but strictly

8

on their part, your Honor.

9

that's not defense, your Honor.

10

They don't just get forfeited because lack of

That's ]ust -- that's not right.

So

It's not even close to a defense

in this case.

11

Now I'm willing to move on from the change orders the

12

famous $78,000.

13

the last two years than it ever wants to hear.

14

central issue in that $78,000, your Honor, and that is that

15

(inaudible) number, Guy Hatch while fully vested with authority,

16

while fully clothed with apparent actual, implied authority came

17

to my client and said, "Here's a change order for the $78,000."

18

Now it's the testimony of these folks and these people

I think the Court's heard more about $78,000 in
But there's a

19

that say that that applied to the Williams property.

20

didn't say it applied to the Williams property.

21

that Mr

22

North Shore II and you're going to be the contractor on it.

23

need $78,000 for the design work for it.

24

responsibilities under your contract, and if you'll work it this

25

way with me, I will give you a change order for design work."

My client

My client said

Hatch came to him and said, "We're going to develop
I

You have design

•626Whether that went to Mark Wilson, whether it went to

1
2

Hubble Engineering for the site work on the present site of the

3

North Shore building, nobody has presented any evidence of where

4

that $78,000 was spent by Guy Hatch.

5

Court whether it's the Williams property or the North Shore

6

property.

7

client knows is that he was promised a change order.

8
9

Nobody r.as presented this

There's not a scintilla of evidence on it.

All my

Your Honor, I ask you to look very carefully on that
exhibit.

The date on that is in March of 2002 -- March of 2002

10

while Guy Hatch had full authority.

11

agency issue.

12

another property or any of those things.

Your Honor, this is a simple

Don't be diverted by allegations in the related to
Mr. -- well all know.

13' Everybody knows that Mr. Hatch was a principal of an undisclosed
14

agent.

15

principal.

16

A principal of an undisclosed agent is liable as is the
They are both liable for that debt.

Now if Mr. Hatch wants to go off and buy a pickup truck

17

for the partnership, I ask the Court, is that binding on the

18

partnership?

19

He's the managing member.

20

Somebody got up -- I think Mr. Chimento got up and said he didn't

21

have authority to incur debt on some other property.

22

of all, we don't know if it was on some other property, but

23

secondly, your Honor, we have a bona fide change order that's a

24

contract.

25

to Hubble himself and said -- and incurred that contract for

Of course it is, your Honor.

He has authority.

He's vested with complete authority.

Well, first

A contract is no different than if Guy Hatch had gone

-6271

$78,000.

2

or any of the prime contractors and given them a contract for

3

$78,000.

4

pay him $78,000 .

5

He could have gone to Hubbs Tile or Allstate Electric

He happened to do it with my client, and he promised to

Keep in mind, your Honor, my client gave him that money.

6

My client drew a check from his bank.

7

benefitted from it.

8

That's not my client's responsibility.

9

spent it at the circus, but he agreed to give him a change order

I don't know what Guy Hatch did with it.

10

and he gave him a change

11

did that.

12

THE COURT:

That partnership

I don't know whether he

order, and he had full authority when he

What do you do about the testimony of your

13

own client saying, "I really didn't know where that money went.

14

I didn't even -- I didn't do anything to find out where it went,"

15

and the fact that he testified as far as he was concerned it

16

seemed like a lot of money for what he saw being done, and it

17

wasn't even done on buildings I or II.

18

MR. POULSEN:

Your Honor, what the testimony -- I mean I

19

want to be very clear about this.

20

didn't know whether it was spent by Hubble on that project, it

21

was paid to Hubble on the Williams property or whether it was

22

spent on the North Shore property.

23
24

The testimony was that he

The Court has an invoice from Hubble Engineering that
was part of the prove-up in this case from Hubble Engineering for

25 I $95,000 on the North Shore property.

There's engineering --
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/ ^ K ^ S U M M A R Y OF INTEREST DUE ON E L L S W O R T H PAULSEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS

st #
1

Date

Due Date

Date Paid

3/6/2001

4/5/2001

4/16/2001

3/6/2001
3/6/2001

4/5/2001
4/5/2001

5/7/2001
6/27/2001

3/6/200 1

4/5/2001

7/5/2001

3/6/2001

4/5/2001

7/18/2001

3/6/2001

4/5/2001

7/26/2001

3/6/2001

4/5/2001

7/3 1/2001

3/6/200 1

4/5/2001

8/10/200 1

3/6/2001

4/5/2001

1 2^21/2002

3/6/200 1
3/6/2001

4/5/2001
4/5/2001

10/14/20U3
12/10/2003

3/6/2001

4/5/2001

not paid

4/16/2001

5/16/2001

not p a i d

none

none

not p a i d

12/15/2000
1/11/200 l

1/14/2001
2/10/2001

2/2/2UU1
2/21/2001

5/31/2001

6/30/2001

7/31/200 1

5/31/2001

6/30/2001

7/17/2001
7/17/2001

8/16/2001
8/16/2001

10/15/2003
12/31/2002
10/15/2003

7/17/2001

8/16/2001

10/15/2003

7/17/2001

8/16/2001

12/10/2003

7/17/2001

8/16/2001

not p a i d

none

none

not p a i d

none

none

not p a i d

Invoice A m o u n t
%

$
$
%
$
$
$
i
$
5

$
$
$
$

4 7 , 4 2 9 87
2 7 , 9 3 8 67

Days Late

Interest Rate

11

10 0 %
10 0 %

32
83

10 0 %

2 6 , 9 7 4 91

91

10 0 %

1 0 , 3 4 3 70

104

10 0 %

3 4 , 2 6 0 58

112

10 0 %

8,000 00

3,961 18

117

10 0 %

1 1 , 1 3 9 70
800 80

127

10 0 %

635

10 0 %

2 0 8 9 02
16 I 3 3 59

922
979

10 0 %
10 0 %

3 6 , 4 5 7 43

991

10 0 %

8 7 , 1 3 8 17

950

10 0 %

7 6 , 2 3 4 93

0

10 0 %
TOTAL

Interest D u e
142 94

$
$
$
$
$
$
J
%
$
$
$
$
$
$

s

3 4 5 , 2 8 4 19

s

2 6 0 , 0 5 0 42

19
11

10 0 %

$
$
%
$
$
$
%
£

10 0 %

7,342 50

31

10 0 %

1,710 8 6
10,601 00

837
502

10 0 %
10 0 %

1 19,425 00

790

10 0 %

32,978.00
5 9 , 5 9 9 41

790
846

10 0 %
10 0 %

6 3 , 5 1 3 28

858

10 0 %

$
£
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$

1 9 7 , 0 7 9 64

0

10 0 %

7 8 , 4 6 5 15

0

244 94
181 92
672 53
294 72
1,051 2 8
126 97
387 6 0
Hansen settlement

-

We-otwood settlement
Halvurson settlement

9,898 44
2 2 , 6 7 9 80

-

never submitted

35,681 15

1,797 37
783 71
62 36

14,929 97

Allbtato settlement
Hansen settlement
Allstate settlement
W e s t w o o d settlement
Halvei son settlement
aftei deducting $ 19,632 90
in invalid COs (Def Ex 37)

10 0 %

$
$

TOTAL

$

17,573.42

$

53,254.56

GRAND T O T A L FOR BOTH BUILDINGS

ne\/er submitted
never
submitted
i

